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PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE IN A GENERAL
EQUILIB~M TIEBOUT WORLD:
EQUALIZATION PROGRAMS, PEER
EFFECTS AND PRIVATE SCHOOL VOUCHERS
ABSTRACT
This paper uses computable general equilibrium simulations to investigate the effect of
private school vouchers. Itimproves onpastcomputational approaches by(i) endogenizing the
funding of public schools through the modelling of an explicit political process at the school
district level; (ii) embedding the private/public school choice in a Tiebout model in which agents
also choose between communities that provide different public school/property tax packages; and
(iii) allowing for a variety of different public school financing mechanisms ranging from purely
local financing and control all the way to pure state funding. While voucher programs are shown
to increase school-based stratification of agents, they tend to decrease residence-based
stratification. This implies that untargeted vouchers may be equity-enhancing under some
institutional settings even when there are no direct improvements in public school efficiency from
increased competition, Furthermore, the effects of targeting vouchers to low income districts may







Increasingly frustrated with the perceived low quality of government-provided education,
many states and localities are looking to the market for solutions. As a result, private school
voucher experiments are under way in Minnesota and Wisconsin; school choice advocates hold
state superintendent positions in many states including Arizona, Georgia and California; and
governors and state legislators are increasingly making vouchers a theme of their campaigns.1 At
the same time, however, uneme over the equity implications of introducing an increased degree of
private school competition persists and has contributed to defeats of voucher proposals in several
legislatures as well as in a recent California referendum. While both sides of the debate seem to
generally accept Friedman’s (1955, 1962) argument that vouchers might result in more efficient
use of public resources in schools, they disagree whether this improvement is likely to be
substantial enough to offset expected equity losses resulting from the loss of highly motivated
students to priva~ schools, in particular for students who remain in low income public schools.
Largely because voucher experiments have been small in scale and relatively recent, empirical
evidence in this debate is still quite scarce. While recent work by Hoxby (1994) suggests we
should expect substantial improvements in public school performance under increased competition,
Grosskopf, Hayes, Taylor and Weber (1995) find only weak support for this proposition when
performance is memured by the degree of inefficiency. Neither of these studies, however, is able
to use data involving private school vouchers. Rather, they rely on current public and private
school data and either speculate or leave the reader to speculate about possible effects from
increased competition through vouchers.2 Thus, even if the empirical literature on school
competition were to agree on the expected magnitude of the efficiency-enhancing effects of
increased competition, it wotid, until data from such experiments becomes available, be difficult to
quantitatively predict the impact of large scale public policy experiments that have never been tried.
In the meantime, the complexity of the issues involved and the ambiguity over the size of
1 There have also been private voucher initiatives in several US cities. For an early progress report on these, see Moe
(1995).
2 Hoxby (1994) uses an instrumental variables strategy to assess the impact of exogenous variations in Catholic School
competition on test scores, educational attainment and wages, while Grosskopf et. al. (1995) use data on Texas public
school districts and an input distance function model to ftnd strong evidence of inefficiencies in public schools but
weak support for the preposition that the degree of competition is related to these inefficiencies.2
opposing effects have made meaningful theoretical work on the topic nearly impossible.3 This
has led several researchers in the direction of constructing plausible computational models of
education markets, calibrating them to available data, and simulating the effects
proposals. While these models obviously must abstract from many real world




education in a way that is impossible to do through either ordinary theoretical or empirical work.
Two recent examples of this approach are represented by the important models in Epple and
Romano (1996) and Manski (1992) on whose insights we seek to build,4
1.1. Simulation Models of Private Scbol Vouchers
Epple and Romano assume there are no efficiency-enhancing effects of competition on public
schools in order to focus on the equity and efficiency implications of a voucher system in the worst
case scenario that such beneficial competitive effects do not exist. Their assumption of a passive
open enrollment public school sector implies that educational quality is the same in each public
school, which means that the public sector can be treated as a single school. Private schools, on the
other hand, maximize profits subject to providing students with their maximum utility obtainable
elsewhere. Furthermore, private schools are able to observe the ability type of each student and
discriminate between students by charging differential tuition. It is immediate in this framework
that all public schools must be of lower quality than every private schools Furthermore,
stratification occurs along two dimensions: all else equal, the public school system absorbs only
the relatively low income and the relatively low ability students. Private schools, M suggested by
Vandenberghe (1996), “skim the cream” off the public schools and may even subsidize the tuition
of low income/high ability students. 6 These theoretical insigh~ as well as additional simulation
3 For one of the few theoretical treatments, see Hoyt and be (1996). In this paper, the authors demonstrate that in
certain environments, vouchers can produce Pareto improvements by causing lower tax rates, and that politically
feasible voucher programs may have this property.
4 Another more macroeconomics oriented approach can be found in Glomm and Ravikumar (1995), and Femandez and
Rogerson (1995) provide an interesting simulation approach to analyzing centralization of school finance.
5 This is true because private schools charge tuition while public schools are free,
6 This allows private schools to internalize peer group externalities through admissions and pricing policies. which is
something not possible for public schools. A tentative efficiency argument in favor of private schools follows in that
the introduction of free public schools eliminates the possibility of a constrained efficient allocation of students
across private schools. The distribution of students across private schools in the absence of free public schools is3
results add fuel to some of the fears voiced by
those who gain from a school choice system
opponents of increased school choice. In the model,
in the absence of beneficial competitive effects on
public schools are those already in the private schools before the voucher program and some of
those who switch from public to private schools, while those remaining in the public schools
experience welfare losses. It should be emphasized, however, that the addition of beneficial
competitive pressures on public schools may soften these adverse equity implications of the model
and could, if strong enough, lead to improvements in welfare for all agents.
Contraty to Epple and Romano, Manski (1992) addresses the tradeoffs between benefits from
competition and adverse peer effects on public schools more direcdy by comparing two extreme
types of public sectors: one that is perfectly efficient (meaning that it spends all i~ resources on
factors that directly benefit students), and another that seeks to maximize its own surplus (by
splitting expenditures into spending on factors that benefits tuden~ and factors that do not benefit
students) subject to the threat of students leaving the system. In both cases, the public sector is
assumed (as in Epple and Romano) to act as one unitary body that receives some exogenous level
of funding per pu-pil. Under the surplus maximizing specification, increased private school
competition leads to an increase in the fraction of public school expenditures devoted to inputs
benefiting students in public schools. Thus, competition directly improves public schools, a
possibility not allowed for in the work by Epple and Romano in which public schools are passive.
In the case of the first specification (that assumes efficient public schools to begin with), this
effect, as expected, does not materialize.7
efficient if the number of schools is efficient (which is not guaranteed). However, if this number happens to be
efficient, then the possibility of discrimination in private school admissions makes possible a Pareto optimum
without public schools but not with them. This, of course, ignores the possibility of other externalities that arise from
greater integration. Others have addressed the peer group externality issues raised by Epple and Romano as well. De
Bartolome (1990) sets out a model of locaI governments with peer effects and demonstrates that voting/locational
equilibria with heterogeneous community compositions can be inefficient because families fail to internalize the peer
group externality when choosing to migrate. It is suggested that one appropriate policy response might be to use
tax/subsidy programs to deal with the externality. Schwab and Oates (1991) demonstrate that, just as private schools
internalize the peer group externality in Epple and Romano, more active public schools could do the same by charging
low peer quality students higher taxes. While this is objectionable on equity grounds, Schwab and Oates proceed to
analyze the same problem when locat governments are constrained to charge equal tax rates. They show that a system
of equalizing grants that compensate communities for accepting low peer quality students may be constrained efficient.
7 For a recent critique of tbe Manski paper, see Moe and Shotts (1996), In addition to pointing out the timitations of the
framework used by Manski, they calculate utility levels for low income parents within the context of the model and
find that, while utility does decrease when there are no efficiency enhancing benefits to competition, these decreases
are very smatl compared to the large increases in utility for the same parents in the presence of those benefits.4
The results from these papers are thus, in many ways, consistent with conventional wisdom:
to the extent that competition improves the public sector, low income parents in the public school
system may benefit, but as these beneficial competitive effects vanish, so do the benefits to low
income parents who are left with the same (efficient) public school but without the more motivated
students who have left for private schools. Since the assumption is that highly motivated students
improve the school, public schools become worse when competition has no efficiency enhancing
effect on the operation of those schools. The characterization of the debate in the opening
paragraph of this paper is therefore confirmed in the simulation literature: there seems to be a
tension between the positive efficiency enhancing effects of vouchers and their possible negative
equity implications. If this is correct, the desirability of vouchers then ultimately rests on the extent
to which positive impacts of competition such u those found by Hoxby (1994) actually exist.
1.2. Features of a New Model
We will argue here that, while both of the simulation models discussed above make great
contributions to our understanding of private school choice, three important elements of public
schooling in US states have been left out. (For a brief illustration of the differences between our
approach and previous models, see Figure 1.) First, both Manski and Epple & Romano model the
public sector as being exogenously funded on a per pupil basis when, in fact, public school
spending is determined through the political interaction of voters and legislators at the state and
local levels. Second, while Man ski considers separately the cases of poor, middle income and
wealthy communities, he does not allow for the endogenous development of public school
populations within communities through the Tiebout (1956) sorting that is familim from the local
public finance literature and that seems particularly relevant in the case of education. Similarly,
while Epple and Romano allow, in principle, for different public schools in different communities,
they assume an open enrollment system which resul~ in all these public schools being identical. In
both models, the empirically relevant fact that individuals sort themselves into communities based
in large measure on income, and thus consume different levels of public education to begin with, is
left out. Finally, neither model attempts to address the differences in expected effects of vouchersin different political settings
different mixes of state and
Specifically, public education is financed through a variety
local financing schemes ranging from purely local funding





the cwe that the effect of vouchers differs under different pre-existing state policies. We therefore
propose to reconsider vouchers in a model in which we relax (i) the assumed erogeneity of
funding for public schools, (ii) both the assumed absence of Tiebout migration effects and the
assumed existence of a homogeneous public sector, and (iii) the assumed lack of state and local
interaction.
We begin by fully defining a local public goods model with multiple local governments
providing different levels of local public school quality (where parental perceptions of school
outputs are a function of local per pupil spending on schools and the average “peer quality” of
studen~ in that school.) Unlike Epple and Romano, however, an agent who sends his child to a
particular school must reside in that school’s district (i.e. no open enrollment), and, unlike Manski,
we assume that agents are mobile between districts. Furthermore, we endogenize local funding for
public education by assuming that local school boards are subject to political pressures in that their
budget (funded through a property tax) is set by the median voter. Thus agents choose not only
whether to attend public or private schools, but also, given market clearing house prices, which
community to reside in and what level of funding for public education within that community to
support at the ballot box.
After analyzing vouchers in the context of this purely local system of public school finance,
we add a higher level government that is also actively engaged in the funding of education. In
particular, we consider the effect of vouchers under three types of institutional schemes other than
a purely locally funded system: (i) a system of exogenously set state foundation (block) grants
financed through a state income tax; (ii) district power equalization (which is equivalent to a system
of exogenously set state matching grants); and (iii) pure state funding of education in which the
state median voter sets the level of spending (funded through an income tax). The first two of
these preserve local control but change local policy incentives, while the third essentially removes
all local control and puts the state in charge of educational funding. We will demonstrate that the
effects of voucher programs depend critically on the type of current institutional setting used6
because these institutions alter the set of expected users of the vouchers as well as the political
implications for public school funding.
Of course, adding these additiond complexities to previous models naturally forces us to
sacrifice some of these previous models’ richness in other dimensions. In particular, we will allow
for neither the rent seeking behavior suggested in Mansk.i nor the complex private school pricing
mechanism derived in Epple and Romano. More precisely, since it is clear from Manski’s work
that modelling public schools as inefficient in the absence of competition improves the equity
properties of vouchers, we will resume efficiency (at least as observed by parents) of both public
and private schools and thus look at worst case equity implications. Furthermore we will assume
that the private school market consists of competitive, profit maximizing schools who charge a
single admissions price for all students and can “cream skim” explicitly in their admissions
policies. 8 Finally, peer quality, is modelled more crudely than in Epple and Romano and Manski
in that we assume that it is perfectly correlated with parental socio-economic status. While these are
simplifications of previous models that should be kept in mind throughout our analysis, they
permit us to focus on an entirely new set of issues not previously analyzed in the literature without
“rediscovering” the important insights already obtained in Manski (the trade-off between adverse
effects from cream skimming and positive effects from competition) and Epple and Romano (the
efficiency and equity implications of price discriminating behavior by private schools.)
Section 2 proceeds to outline the model, and Section 3 comments on computational issues.
Section 4 then investigates the general equilibrium effects of vouchers in a variety of institutional
settings, and Section 5 ends with comments on the limitations of the model, possible extensions to
the analysis and some concluding remwks.
2. The Model
The computable general equilibrium model developed here is calibrated to New Jersey datag
8 For reasons elaborated below, the more complicated pricing mechanism of Epple and Romano loses its intuitive appeal
under our setting.
9 While we have thus made an attempt to calibrate the model to be consistent with the data, we do not take the view that
the simulation results offered should be interpreted very literally. In pwticular, since any computational model must
m&e a number of simplifying assumptions, we view our approach as an extension of theory that, tike pure theory, can
aid in developing basic intuitions concerning the nature and magnitude of vtious general equilibrium effects. Our focus
witl therefore be on general lessons learned from the analysis rather than a literal interpretation of any single set of7
and is based on the theoretical model in Nechyba (1996a) where the existence of an equilibrium
without private schools is proved.10 The model takes as given community boundaries that divide
a large set of different houses into local political entities which produce public schooling funded
through a property tax. An additional political unit called the state (or nation) encompasses all
communities and may finance additional education programs through a state income tax. There are
no a priori restrictions on the mix of house types across communities; i.e. some communities may
have a fairly homogeneous housing stock while others have both “good” and “bad” houses.
Similarly, some communities may be inherently more preferred because of particular community
qualities. The model is therefore attempting to explain neither the evolution of the housing stock
nor the formation of communities. Rather, it takes these as having evolved exogenously and
resulting from some given history. 11 Its potentially heterogeneous intracommunity housing
structure allows for the empirically important possibility of the coexistence of rich and poor sectors
within a particular community, a feature not possible in models that view housing as a perfectly
divisible, homogeneous good (Epple, Filimon and Romer (1993), Rose-Ackerman (1979)).
Consumers in the model own both houses and some amount of the private good, both of which are
tradeable at market prices, and choose their optimal place of residence given their preferences and
budgets. The existence of a land market rather than housing exogenously supplied by absentee
landlords (as is common in the literature (see, for example, Epple, Filimon and Romer (1993)))
enables the model to seriously investigate capitalization and its impact on communities. Finally,
each agent also votes on the level of local property taxation (or state income taxation in the case of a
state financed public school system).
simulation numbers.
10 The sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in this model are fairly weak compared to others in the
literature. They include standard assumptions on preferences and technologies without the usual single crossing
conditions (Westhoff (1977), Epple, Fitimon and Romer ( 1993)) and without Dunz’s (1985) independence assumption.
It is trivial to extend the existence theorem to the case of private schools as noted below, Also, in this paper we
deviate from Nechyba (1996b) in that we do not explicitly model a separate state public good because it would add little
to the analysis.
11 Since construction of new houses is not possible in the context of the model (and is technically extremely difficult to
model (see Nechyba (1996a)), the model is most appropriate to the analysis of a relatively developed urban/suburban
economy. We do not view this as a particular weakness of the approach because it is in such economies that private
school competition is likely to have an effect. (Demand for private schools in remote and undeveloped rural areas is
likely to be less of a factor due to tie limited market size.)8
2.1 Endowments and Preferences
The main elements of both the general model as well as its CGE derivative are summarized
formally in Table 1. The set N represents both the set of agents and the set of houses in the model,
where n= N is defined as that agent who is initially endowed with house n.12 A fixed
community structure C is imposed on this set of houses and partitions it into a set of house types
H=(l,...,h ,...,~} spread over a set of communities M=( 1,..., m,iii}iii}. C~~, then, is both the
set of houses of type h in community m and the set of agenk initially endowed with such
houses. The CGE version presented here defines N=[O, 1], H=( 1,2,3) and M={ 1,2,3}, which
implies the existence of nine different house endowment types (three house types in each of three
communities). Each of these is assumed to be represented in the economy in equal numbers; i.e.
# (C~h) = 1/9. (1)
In addition to his house endowment, each agent n is also endowed with a strictly positive
amount of private good z(n) called income. The set of income levels is assumed to be finite which
gives rise to a set of income classes I = {1,,. .,i,.. .,: 1). This implies that the house and income
endowments jointly define a set of endowment types
E = (Etii I(m,h,i)~ MxHxI} (2)
where eti l Etii is an agent that falls into the income class i and is endowed with a house of type
h in community m. Our CGE model contains five of these income classes (with incomes of 2,3.5,
5,6.5 and 8 roughly corresponding to New Jersey household income levels scaled by $10,000).
These, combined with the three house types in each of three communities, generates 45
endowment types each of which is represented qually in the economy; i.e.
1 V (m,h,i)~ MxHxI.13 ~(Etii) = ~ (3)
Finally, agents are endowed with a utility function u“:MxHxR ~+ R+ which takes as its
argumen~ the community and house type the agent lives in, private good consumption zc R+, and
12
13
More precisely, the set of houses and consumers is defined m part of a measure space (N,~p) where p is taken to be
the Lebesgue measure. AU subsets referred to are henceforth assumed to be measurable.
Some have suggested that this uniform distribution of income is not endrely realistic. While this is true, we refer the
reader to footnote 9 which notes that we do not view the calibration of the model as an important feature of the
analysis. The effect of a skewed distribution of income on local versus state voting outcomes has been treated
effectively in Sonstelie and Silva (1995). Furthermore, we note that, despite the frequent use of the term “high income
agents” later in the paper, this is very much a model of middle income communities (given top incomes of $80,000),9
a perceived school quality level SER+. In the CGE version, all agents have the same utility
function which is defined as follows: 14
PY un(m,h,s,c) = ktis c V n~N.15 (4)
where (m,h) is the community and house type of residence, s is their school’s quality and c is their
private good consumption.
2.2. Parental Perceptions of School Quality
The inclusion of school quality rather than student achievement in the utility function deserves
some attention. As suggested by the household production function literature (Becker (1991)),
school quality is only one of the inputs in the production of student achievement. The other,
parental commitment of time and resources, plays a major role as well (Hanushek (1986)). While
parents therefore care directly about student achievement (where achievement as defined by
parents may entail substantially more than good test scores), they care about school quality only
indirectly w one of the inputs required in the production process of this achievement. Thus, the
utility function in (4) is somewhat “reduced form” in nature because school quality rather than




As demonstrated in Nechyba (1996a), there is no technical problem in including spillovers or population externalities
in the model. We mmment on the effect of such externalities on our resulk in Section 5.
This utility function satisfies all conditions necessary for the existence of an equilibrium (Nechyba (1996a)). The
pmameters are set to be consistent with New Jersey micro tax data in Nechyba (1996c). Preferences are assumed to be
identical not only for computational convenience but also because skatification results in Nechyba (1996a) imply that
under these conditions, the equilibrium assignment of agents into house types is unique, Finally, we should note that
the CGE model described in Nechyba (1996b,c) contains an additional state public good financed by a state income tax.
This feature has been “turned off’ for the present exercise because it is not relevant to the issues discussed in this paper.
We can think, for example, of the following simple motivating example for this reduced form: Suppose each agent has
a utility function of the form u(~a,c) = Pa~c~ where [is parental leisure, a is the child’s achievement and c is parental
consumption. In order to avoid a direct laborfleisure choice (which is not part of our model), suppose that income z is
exogenous (perhaps the result of a 40-hour workweek), and that parents are endowed with 1 unit of leisure (which
cannot be used for working; i.e. there is no overtime. ) Further, let us abstract for this illustration from the Tiebout
model in the text and assume that any level of school quality s can be purchased on the market at price p per unit and
that the child’s achievement level a is determined by a=ssx(l-s) where x is the amount of leisure parents spend on their
child’s education at home. Parents then solve the following maximization problem:
rnax u (Lac) = ~a~c~ subiect to C=z-ps
X,5 ,




(y+ps) p (a+~( l-~))




which implies c . — This result is equivalent to the
(y+pb)
which parental inputs are ignored and parents care directly10
usually not acknowledged explicitly, is standard in the entire literature cited in the introduction. It is
important, however, to recognize that the school quality argument in the utility function represents
school quali~ as defined and perceived by parents. While the education production function
literature reviewed by Hanushek (1986) is still unclear as to what school inputs matter in
determining test scores, school quality (and student achievement) more broadly defined may
include other aspects of schools (music classes, athletic activities, etc. ) that have little relation to
test scores themselves but that may nevertheless be important to parents. 17
This parentally defined school quality is provided by local governments (and in a later version
by the state government) as well as private institutions, and we assume that both private and public
school quality is judged by parents as if itresulted from a production process that uses as inputs
both per pupil spending and the peer quality in the school (as measured by per capita income of
parents). If per pupil spending in the school is Z, and average peer quality is P,, we define the
perceived school quality as
z ([-P) ~~P,18 (5) s =f~ (z~, p~) = s
where p E R+ is a parameter indicating the strength of the peer effect paren~ perceive. Thus, if
p=O, only spending matters to parents, while if p= 1, only peer effects matter. Furthermore, we
define Ps=I~15 (where 1, is the average income of parents who send theii-children to the school in
question) to make peer values roughly equal in order of magnitude to per pupil spending, which
then allows us to more easily interpret different values of p. (For example, p=O.5 can then be
interpreted to mean that parents place roughly equal value on pwr effects and spending.)
17
18
about school quality; i.e. the outcome is equivalent to
m~axu (s,c) = SLC(l-*)subjwt to C=z-ps
pb
when k=—, While this still circumvents issues related to endogenous labor/leisure choices, it illustrates the
(y+pb)
general motivation for viewing school quality as a reduced form argument that enters directty into utility functions,
It could, for example, be that spending really does not matter very much in determining test scores because lower
spending is replaced by increased parental inpuw; i.e. parents purchase private music lessons when schools no longer
fund them, or parents are more vigilant in monitoring homework progress as studentiteacher ratios rise. In that case,
parents may care about spending despite the empirical observation that spending is not correlated with test scores.
Empirical evidence to the effect that parents provide less effort as schools improve can be found in Houtenville (1996).
Note that we assume that parenk act a.r if there was this underlying production process. An alternative interpretation
is to think of parents simply caring about peer quality and spending without actually having an underlying production
process in mind; i.e. all else equal, parents simply desire to have high income peers for their children. (We have also
attempted to use other CES production functions. Since results do not change qualitatively they go unreported here. )11
Again, we take no position in this paper on either the “proper” definition of school quality or
the “true” level of p. We do, however, argue that the empirical evidence suggests strongly a
definition of school quality by parents that makes the perceived level of p significantly less than 1;
that is, the fact that parents in different school districts choose to spend dramatically different
amounts on education, and the fact that educational spending is such a strong focus in court battles
implies that parents must believe spending to be an important input to the production process of
school quality as they define it. If they did not, all communities would spend the minimum amount
necessary to run a public school. We therefore do not consider cases where p= 1 in this paper, but
we do allow for the possibility that parental perceptions are wrong, and that the true p is actually
equal to 1 (i.e., spending does not matter.) For this reason, we report not only the parentally
perceived quality level in our simulation results, but also the level of per pupil spending on
education and the peer quality level for each community. The only factor that matters for parental
choices, however, is the perceived p and the resulting perceived definition of quality.
Finally, we note in passing that our specification of peer effects is consistent with the general
empirical findings in Henderson, Mieszkowski and Sauvageau (1978) in that they are modelled as
equally important for high income and low income students. 19
19 We chose this fairly primitive specification of peer effects after attempting to learn the me nature of peer effects from
the empirical literature. First highlighted in the Coleman Report (1966), peer effects have long been thought to play a
vital role in education, Summers and Wolfe (1977), using pupil specific evidence from Philadelphia, find evidence to
confirm the Coleman finding that less able students benefit from more able peers while high ability students are little
affected by peers (which contrasts with our specification h which peer effects are equal for all students). Henderson,
Mies&owski and Sauvageau (1978), however, while documenting strong evidence for peer effects among French
speaking Canadian students, find that these peer effects are equally present for both high and low ability students,
consistent with our specification. In an important recent paper, Evans, Oates and Schwab (1992) cast doubt on all
these results by demonstrating that, in the case of teenage pregnancy and school dropout behavior, strong peer effects
are found with standard regressions but vanish when endogeneity problems are addressed. This suggests that past
results on peer effects may be very much overstated. Link and Mulligan (199 I) paint a very complex picture of peer
effects along both ability and racial lines and find that some groups (in particular blacks) benefit from having others in
that group in the class room. As is well known, the education production function literature is similarly littered with
contradictory evidence (Hanushek (1986)), but recent cross country examinations have provided further evidence that
peer effects of tie kind we model may be quite important (Toma (1996)). As a result of these ambiguous findings.
theoretical models typically pick a somewhat simple specification of peer effects that is consistent with some past
empirical measurements (Brueckner and Lee (1989), Arnott and Rowse (1987)). For a good summary of general
theoretical existence and welfare theorems in models with arbitrary population externalities, see Scotchmer (1994),
and for an excelfent demonstration of the empirical difficulties involved in measuring peer effects, see Manski (1993).12
2.3. The heal Public Sector
Local public schools are funded through proportional property taxes set in accordance with
majority rule voting by local residents, and we assume that only residents within a community can
attend that community’s public school. Voters are assumed to be myopic in the sense that they tie
community compositions, property values and their choice of private or public schooling as given
when they go to the polls. (Voter myopia is a relatively standard assumption in the literature (see
Epple, Filimon and Romer (1993), Dunz (1986), Rose-Ackerman (1979)) and is inconsistent only
out of equilibrium .)20 Since local budgets have to balance, the relationship between t~, the local
tax rate, and Sm,the perceived public school quality in community m, is one to one and given by
(t~ (cm) (1-P) & p
Sm= )() N (students~ 15
(6)
where P(Cm) = ~ (L (Cmh) F (Cmh)) is the local property tax base. This base varies with the
h~ H
endogenously determined house price function ~: MxH+R+ that gives rise to a house price
—
vector p= R~h; i.e. the function ~ assigns a unique price to each house type in each jurisdiction.
(The first term is simply per pupil spending in the public school in community m.) This, combined
with myopic voting and standard assumptions on preferences, is shown in Nechyba (1996a) to
yield single peaked preferences over local school spending levels (or, equivalently, over local
property tax rates) which in turn implies the existence of local voting equilibria.21
Agents are also assumed to be myopic in their location decisions in that they take prices, other
public good levels and other agents’ locations m given. They do not, however, take their choice of
public versus private school as given when they make their migration choices; that is, when
determining their maximal utility in each potential place of residence, they consider both the case of
attending private and the cme of attending public schools.
20
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This is because all expectations implicitly held by myopic voters are fulfitled irs equilibrium when voters vote holding
levels of public goods, community compositions and property values fixed at the actual equilibrium vulues. Thus, in
equilibrium, voters correctly take current levels of these variables into account. Myopic voting of this kind is
essential for the theoretical work underlying these simulations; without it, we would not be able to make the
statements regarding existence and “uniqueness” of equilibria below that seem to us as important underpinnings for our
methodological approach.
Note that we avoid the Stiglitz (1974) non-single peakedness problem by assuming that individuals vote on local
public schools holding fixed their choice over public versus private schools. Thus, if the voter has chosen a private
school, his ideal point is a local tax rate of zero and his preferences are single peaked. If, on the other hand, the voter
has chosen the public system, his preferences are single peaked u demonstrated in Nechyba (1996a).13
2.4. Other Institutional Settings
Thus far we have defined the local public sector under a system of pure local public finance via
the property tax. We will also consider other financing mechanisms of public schools. In
particular, we will discuss the effect of private school vouchers under a state foundation grant
system, a district power equalization system and a pure state financed system.22 We will discuss
these in more detail in Section 4. For now, we simply note that foundation grants are per pupil
block grants to local governments who are obligated to spend them on public education and have
the discretion to raise additional funds for local public schools through a local property tax (set in
accordance with majority rule). The block grants are funded by the state government through a
proportional state income tax. District power equalization, on the other hand, is a system of
matching granh with a negative match rate for high tax base districts and positive matching rates
for low tax base districts. The intent of the program is to insure that equal tax rates imply equal
spending levels across communities, and we will resume that the program is revenue neutral; i.e.
the revenues raisd from the negative match rates on high base communities is exactly sufficient to
cover the positive matching grants to poor communities. Therefore no additional state income tax
revenues me necessary, and local property tax rates continue to be set by the median voter. Finally,
a pure state funded system involves no local propefiy taxes and only a proportional state income
tax whose rate is set by the median voter in the state.
2.5. Private Schools
Finally, with no cle~ guidance from the empirical literature as to the appropriate objective
functions of private schools, we assume that private schools are small, competitive and profit-
maximizing institutions that each set a single tuition level (equal, due to the zero profit condition, to
per pupil spending in that school) as well as a minimum peer quality standard below which they
will not admit any students. Since we allow private schools to be relatively small, we are implicitly
assuming that all scale effects are exhausted relatively early .23 Furthermore, we implicitly assume
22 For technical definitions of these programs, see Nechyba (1996b).
23 There is little empirical evidence to support large economies of scale for schools beyond a few hundred students,
Dewey, Husted and Kenny (1995), for example, find no support for this.14
away the type of price discriminating behavior derived in Epple and Romano where private schools
subsidize high peer quality children. While we think such behavior on the part of private schools is
reasonable under the assumptions in Epple and Romano, it strikes us as unreasonable in the
context of our model. More specifically, since we have made the simplifying assumption that peer
quality is perfectly correlated with income, the price discriminating behavior in Epple and Romano
would imply regressive tuition structures .24 We consider this an empirically unlikely outcome,
especially in the presence of voucher systems that are likely to be implemented in a political
environment that would explicitly prohibit such price discrimination. Our model therefore results in
a private sector in which each private school is completely homogeneous; that is, each private
school, if it has positive enrollment, has studen~ of only the minimum peer quality (because higher
quality peers have their own private schools) and charges tuition equal to the most preferred level
of tuition for that peer group (because if a different level of tuition were charged, a new entrant
could make positive profits and attract all students to his school with a different tuition level).as
2.6. Definition, fiistence and “Uniqueness” of Equilibria
An equilibrium under some arbitr~ state program x (where x codd be a system of foundation
gran~, district power equalization, or vouchers) is defined as follows:
24 We should further note that implementing Epple and Romano’s differential pricing scheme in a model with multiple
communities (such as ours) would be technically extremely challenging.
25 This logic is similar to Hamilton’s (1975) familiar zoning argument in which communities (rather than private
schools) fix a local taxlspending package (analogous to tuition levels) and set a minimum zoning requirement
(analogous to our minimum peer quality). In the course of our analysis, we have also investigated two other private
school market assumptions:
1. A single non-profit private school that seeks to maximize enrollment. (This is similar to one of Manski’s
specifications. )
2. A single non-profit, cream stiing private school that seeks to maximize enrollment subject to not accepting
students below a certain “peer quality”.
We have foregone reporting results under these assumptions for several reasons: (i) additional technical problems arise
that complicate the analysis; (ii) results are qualitatively similar but more difficult to interpret; and (iii) most
importantly, we do not view either of the above assumptions as plausible in equdibria in which private schools can
differentiate on the basis of peer qualities. More precisely, under both these assumptions, another private school could
arise and make positive profits by catering to certain peer groups. This competitive process then leads to the outcome
we assume in the body of the paper that many private schools who cater to each type will arise. In such an
environment, each school charges the optimal tuition for the members of the type they are serving. Unless schools
can find a way of mixing individuals of different types within one school, there is no way to break this equilibria.
The only such tool would involve price discrimination which, we argue in the text, is unlikely to arise and is
politically infeasible in a model such as ours.15
Deftition: An equilibrium (J,p, t,x,.s,.s~)under $tate program x is a list of population assignments
m tax rates t~ R ~, local public school quality levels to communities J, prices p~ R + ,







prices clear the market; i.e. there is no excess demand or supply for any house;
all local government budgets balance;
consumers cannot gain utility by moving and/or changing schools;
local property tax rates are determined through majority rule;
if positive, private school spending in each school is equal to the most preferred
spending level by its homogeneous customers;
any net costs the state government incurs under state program x must be fully
financed through a proportional state income tax.27
As noted already, Nechyba (1996a) proved the existence of equilibria in the presence of peer
effects (spillovers) when there are no private schools. Extending the mere existence result to the
case of private schools is trivial: simply assume that there are no public schools. In that case,
everyone attends a private school and votes for zero spending on public schools (given that they
have chosen private schools). Existence of this new but trivial equilibrium can be shown by the
same methods as employed in Nechyba (1996a). Similar somewhat less trivial equilibria in which a
subset of the local communities provide no public education can be shown to exist. However, the
interesting type of equilibrium in this model is one that generates, under certain policies, a mix of
public and private education in each community. The stratification results in Nechyba (1996a)
suggest that, when preferences are identical and communities are sufficiently different in their
inherent desirability (i.e. when utility functions are identical and the kti’s in those utility functions
are sufficiently different as in this model), the ptiition of agents into communities in the presence
26
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Note that J = {Jti c N I p(Jmh)=v(Cmh) v (m,h)~ MxH ) and C are both partitions of N. The difference, however,
is that C assigns houses (and the irritiat distribution of agents) to house types and communities, while J gives the
equilibrium assignment of agents to houses and communities. For a more formal definition of both an economy and an
equilibrium, see Nechyba (1996a).
We also use an analogous equilibrium concept for the last case considered in this paper in which local governments no
longer fund public education but rather the state government takes over this funding. In that case, condition (ii)
changes to read “the s[ate budget must balance”, and condition (iv) reads “the state income tax rate is determined
through majority rule voting. ”16
of public schools in all communities is unique up to a transformation of prices .28The computable
model in this paper attempts to find this equilibrium and only when it cannot, resorts to the least
trivial equilibrium (i.e. the equilibrium under which the fewest possible number of communities
have no public school.) As we will see, however, under some policies, no equilibria with public
schools in every community exist.
2.7. Calibration of the Model
The utility function in the model is parametrized to be consistent with data from several school
districts in Camden County, New Jersey. Other parameters, such as endowments and community
sizes were arbitrarily fixed. The calibration described here is therefore “partial” in the sense that,
while parameter values are picked to be consistent with data, the benchmark equilibria reported in
Table 2 are computed (and then observed to be consistent with the data). Due to space
considerations, the specifics of this parameterization are not reported here (see Nechyba (1996c)).
We do note, however, that the model must be re-parameterized for different assumed values of p in
the perceived education production process; i.e. in order to keep public school spending levels
consistent with the data, ~*p must be constant, which means that ~ must be adjusted as our
assumptions about p change. Finally, we refer the reader to footnote 9 which cautions against
overinterpreting any specific set of simulation numbers.
3. Computation of and Characteristics of Equilibria
Each simdation begins with the number of private schools set to zero and calculates the “public
school benchmark equilibnum’’without private schools. (This process is illustrated in Figure 2).
The CGE program to calculate these benchmark equilibria begins with the information contained in
Table 1 as well as a vector of initial house prices. It iterates to an equilibrium by first fmdin.g local
election outcomes, then determining equilibrium prices given those outcomes, before using those
prices (and the new community compositions) to update election results, and so fofi.2g
28 Due to the discreteness of the house types, however, prices themselves may vary within small intervals, as may local
public good levels. The computer program picks the frrst equilibrium price vector within those intervals that it finds.
Simulation tests have shown these intervals to be quite narrow. Furthermore, simulation tests indicate that the inherent
differences across communities (the ~’s) are sufficiently different to yield uniqueness of the equilibrium partition of
agents.
29 me program is written in GAMS (Generat Algebraic Manipulation System).17
More precisely, the program uses the initial data in Table 1 to identify each community’s
median voter who takes prices and everyone’s location as given. That voter’s optimal choice
determines the community’s school spending level (and local property tax rate) which, combined
with the endogenously determined peer level, determines the perceived public school output level.
Given these election results, the program iterates to find equilibrium property values. In particular,
during every iteration, each agent’s optimal location at the current prices is determined, and these
prices are adjusted upward (by a small fixed amount) if the house type in question WM in excess
demand during this and the past iteration and downward (by the same amount) if it was in excess
supply during these iterations. If a particular house type alternated between being in excess demand
and excess supply, the previous two prices Me averaged. This process, while not guaranteed to
converge, typically does converge within twenty iterations. Once equilibrium prices have been
found, i.e. once excess demands for all houses are zero, the program starts over with a new major
iteration by identifying median voters in the new community populations. The process continues
until the perceived school output levels, the local tax rates and the prices have converged,
Throughout the process, the value of each agent’s initial house endowment is used to determine
that agent’s budget. Values typically converge within several major iterations and are only slightly
sensitive to initial prices (subject to scaling).
The public school benchmark equilibrium without governmental interaction is presented in
Table 2 with p=O.O (i.e. for the case when parents care only about school spending). School
spending levels (equal to perceived school output levels in this case) can be interpreted as per pupil
spending by local govemmenu. The school spending figures fall within the actual range of per
pupil spending on education (roughly between $2500 and $5000) for Camden County in 1987 (for
which the model was calibrated). Agents separate into low, middle, and high income communities,
but there is some overlap due to overlapping values of the k~~’s (see Table 1). Higher income
communities tend to have higher school spending levels and lower property tax rates, and property
values (the value of yearly housing services) tend to increase in community wealth. The fact that
property values are inversely related to property taxes in Table 2 is simply due to the fact that
property in community 3 is inherently (i.e. all else being equal) more desirable than property in18
community 2 which again is inherently more desirable than property in community 1. (This is
reflected in the different values of ~ as reported in Table 1.)30
Note that the only feature of Table 2 that is exogenous is the sum of the entries in the “Income”
column. Each entry in that column represents the average household income within that
community. Since the average income endowment (see Table 1) is 5, the average of the entries in
the income column will always be equal to 5. Everything else in the table is endogenous. “Wealth”
is defined as the community average of individual incomes from both private good endowments
and property endowments; “Property” is the average house value in the community; “Prop. Tax” is
the tax rate on the yearly housing services in the community; “School” is the parentally perceived
level of school quality (as defined in equation (5)); “LPSpend” is per pupil spending in local public
schools; “LPeer” is the peer quality level in the local public school; and “%Private” is the fraction
of parents sending their children to private schools. (In later simulation tables, “PrPeer” is the
average peer quality level of children attending private schools. ) All dollar values are scaled by
$10,000.
So f~, the benchmark equilibrium does not include private schools. Once the public school
equilibrium (of the kind presented thus far) is determined through the algorithm described in Figure
2, we proceed to calculate the actual equilibrium with private schools from this public school
benchmark. This process is illustrated in Figure 3. More precisely, we determine each type’s most
preferred private school tuition level under our assumption that private schools perfectly
discriminate between different peer quality types, taking as given the present location of all agents
as well w all prices, taxes and public school levels. By comparing each agent’s utility under local
public school consumption to his utility under the new private school option, we determine
whether he is a private or public school consumer. We then recalculate voting outcomes (by
assuming that private school attendees have single peaked preferences over public school levels
30 It has been suggested that, were entrepreneurs to enter the model, they would choose to build houses solely in
community 3 because of the higher property values. This is not necessarily the case, Property values here can be
thought of as the value of both the land the houses are built on arrd the houses themselves, They are higher in
community 3 than elsewhere because (i) land may be inherently more desirable in community 3 (scenery, lakes, trees,
etc. ) md (ii) a house of type i in community 3 may be bigger and better than a house of type i in other communities.
(The fact that houses in atl tiee communities are labeled 1, 2 and 3 should not necessarily be interpreted to mean that a
house of type i in community m is identical to a house of type i in community m’. These differences could be due to
exogenous phenomena such as zoning. ) Thus, entrepreneurs would not automatically choose to build in community 3:
while property values are higher, so are land costs and house construction. The fact that houses are extraordinarily
expensive in Beverly Hills, for example, does not imply that entrepreneurs will build new houses only in Beverly
Hills.19
with peak at zero spending). Given these outcomes as well as prices, consumers then choose their
most preferred location and public/private school simultaneously, and prices adjust until supply
equals demand. Then a new iteration begins with a new voting stage, a new price adjustment
phase, etc. until the process converges (usually within a few iterations). In many cases, such as in
the benchmwk case reported in Table 2, the addition of the private school option does not change
the initial benchmark equilibrium, and no private schools arise. In this case, only one iteration in
Figure 3 occurs and simply gives confirmation that the public school benchmark equilibrium is in
fact also an actual equilibrium with the potential for private schools, The reason no private school
arises for the benchmark public school equilibrium when p=O (Table 2) is that, in the absence of
peer effec~, disagreements within communities concerning the level of public school spending are
not sufficiently large to induce anyone to choose to opt out and pay his most preferred private
school tuition.ql
Under higher peer effects, we might expect a larger propensity of high income/high peer
quality types to opt out of the public school system. This is, in fact, precisely what happens. Table
3 shows both the Public School Benchmark Equilibrium (i.e. the output from the process in Figure
1) as well as the Actual Equilibrium (with private schools). Note that the former is considerably
more stratified than the equilibrium in Table 2 where p was set to O rather than 0,5. This is an
observation that will, ceteris paribus, hold throughout the simulation results we present in this
paper: In the absence of private schools, increased perceived peer effects lead to larger residential
stratification of agents based on income and wealth, wre stratified property values as well as
more stratified public outcomes. When we allow for the existence of private schools, however, as
peer effects get large, private schools appear in low income communities (see Table 3(b)).
Furthermore, these private schools decrease the level of residential stratification as high income
residents find it advantageous to settle in low income neighborhoods (to avoid house payments in
31 The reader may express some initial skepticism at this point because the model so far predicts no private schools while
we do observe private schools in the real world. We have three conunents in this regard: (i) If peer effects were larger,
as we will see shortly, we would see very high income individuals form private schools. (ii) If some individuals have
strong preferences for private (perhaps religious) education, our framework would predict the private schools to arise
even in the absence of peer effects (see Long and Toma (1988)). (iii) The current model looks at moderate to middle
income households earning between $20,000 and $80,00C. The absence of substantially wealthier individuals is in
part responsible for the lack of interest in any private school in the absence of peer effects (see Schmidt (1992)). Our
suspicion is that private school enrollments in the presence of Tiebout stratification are primarily due to inherent
preferences for some particular form of private (especially religious) education as well as the presence of very high
income families. These types of individuals are not the focus of the present analysis.20
high income neighborhoods that capitalize good public schools) and attend private schools. Thus,
while community 1‘s average income is substantially higher due to these different location patterns
caused by the private school, the increase in peer group effects in that community’s public school
is small in comparison (and uncharacteristic of the rest of the simulation results reported
below. 32) The peer level in the private school, however, is 0.5333 which indicates that the
average parental income of students attending that school is 8 (0.5333 times 15) which is the
highest income of any agent in the model. Thus, private schools are occupied by high income
agents who reside in low income communities in order to take advantage of private schools, The
perceived public school quality, however, rises not because of the small increase in the peer quality
in community 1‘s public school, but more because of increased per pupil spending on public
education. This increase occurs as more local funds per pupil are available due to lower public
school enrollment in community 1 and as those attending private schools pay a disproportionately
lmge share of local taxes (because they reside in the best houses) while not consuming any of the
locally provided public education. (The fact that the private school attendees now vote for zero
public school spending does not change the median voter result sufficiently to offset the former
positive impact on per pupil spending.)
In moving from the equilibrium without private schools (Table 3(a)) to the equilibrium with
private schools (Table 3(b)), the migration of high income residents comes from the middle income
community. Thus, while we see an increase in all variables in the poorest community as a result of
the migration, the middle income community suffers from lower property values as well as
decreased spending and peer effects in its public school. Community 3, on the other hand, remains
largely unaffected as its high income residents are still sufficiently satisfied with their public
schools. As we show in the next table, however, ~ peer effects rise further, private schools show
an increasing presence in all three communities.
In Table 4, we report average community variables for levels of p ranging from Oto 0.7. (As
32 As demonstrated below, the introduction of private schools more commonly leads to a decline in peer quality in low
income public schools. The small increase in peer quality here is due to capitalization effects that increased the total
income of a small low income segment of the population (that is endowed with community l/type 2 houses)
sufficiently for them to reside in community 2 rather than community 1. They are replaced by some residents of
community 1 who used to reside in higher quality houses in that community, thus opening the higher quality houses for
some higher income residents who choose the public schools. These effects are usually minor (see the relatively small
change in individual house values) compared to otiers and therefore play virtually no role irr the rest of tie paper.21
indicated previously, it makes little sense to push p much closer to 1 because of the substantial
empirical evidence that suggests parents in fact do care about public school spending. Furthermore,
even at p=O.7, public schools have already almost disappeared as peer effects are large enough for
enough agen~ to forego the public sector, consume individualized private education instead and
vote public schools out of existence. ) Although these results are not surprising, they are illustrative
of the potential importance of peer effects m well as the potentially misguided emphasis by state
supreme courts on per pupil spending. When p=o and local communities use property taxation,
communities are stratified along income and wealth lines not because there is any inherent
advantage from having high income neighbors but rather because the demand for public education
and housing is monotonic in income. Thus, stratification occurs due to differences in final
demands for public outputs and houses. As p rises, however, there is an inherent advantage high
income individuals gain by segregating themselves (assuming, as is done here, that peer quality is
perfectly correlated with family income). As a result, Table 3 shows an increasing degree of
stratification along income and wealth lines with increasing values of p until peer effects become
large enough to cause the appearance of private schools. As soon as private schools appear, we
observe less residential stratification: 33 once private schools for high income individuals become
an option, desirable houses in low income communities become sought after by high income
individuals who migrate to take advantage of lower prices without having to endure bad public
schools. Again, the appearmce of private schools catering to high income residents in community
1 does not improve local public schools directly; but indirectly, the fact that more money is now
available per pupil more than offsets, in the eyes of parenh, the lower peer quality levels in the
public schools. Peer effects thus have the potential of driving the local public goods economy
towards substantially larger inequities, but cream skimming private schools can stop and reverse
that trend. It is worth emphasizing again that those choosing priva~ schools in poor communities
are not the original (pre-private schools) residents of those communities but rather high income
migrants who are fleeing communities in which they would be paying a premium for their house
due to relatively good public schools. Furthermore, we see the fraction of students in private
33 This is mnsistent with stylized trends and anecdotal evidence from many US cities in which Catholic Schools open (at
subsidized tuitions) and cause an in-migration of middle income families who send their children to those schools. It is
also consisknt with empirical econometric evidence (Dowries and Greenstein (1996)).22
schools leveling off at 0.3333 in community 1 because only one third of the houses in community
1 are sufficiently desirable for high income residents to live there. Thus, once all the residents of
those houses are attending private schools, new private schools begin to open in community 2.
The voucher simulations in the following section begin with the actual equilibrium (with private
schools) and find the new equilibrium as different levels of vouchers are introduced. The new
equilibria are calculated in much the same way as the initial equilibrium except that the CGE
program now begins with the initial equilibrium. Each agent’s wealth, however, is now affected by
price changes of his equilibrium house, not his initial house endowment (which he sold on his
way to the initial equilibrium.) When different magnitudes of a voucher program are simulated, the
simulation always begins with the initial equilibrium; i.e. the following tables should not be read u




paper, we will simulate a very simple voucher program, under which each
resident of each community is entitled to a voucher of the amount specified by the program. The
state government commits to re-imburse private schools for the face value of the voucher, which
thus allows residents to use their voucher as part of their tuition. If the face value of the voucher is
larger than the tuition of a school, then the school gets paid the tuition and the state keeps the
difference. Thus, in equilibrium, tuition is never set below voucher levels. The state pays for the
voucher program through an income tax which residenN/voters know at the time they make their
moving and voting decisions.
4.1. Private School Vouchers in hcally Financed School Systems
Table 5 presents equilibrium community averages for all three communities under different
levels of state vouchers when all financing for the public school system occurs at the local level.
We report here results for both p=O and p=O.5. In the case of p =0, the results are very
straightforward. Since peer effects do not matter and since agents have already chosen school
distric~ in part based on per pupil spending, no one chooses to use vouchers until the level of the
voucher comes close to the level of current local public spending in one of the communities. (It is
conceivable that some agents could want significantly more spending than is provided in any23
community and thus chooses to make use of vouchers early on. However, agents are already
sufficiently segregated, and there are no extremely high income agents whose demand for spending
would be sufficiently high in the model. This means that vouchers are not used until they are close
to current spending levels.) Once vouchers are sufficiently high for some agenm to use them, all
agents in that community will use them which implia the local public school collapses from lack of
public support, and property taxes fall to zero .34 Thus, it is extremely difficult to get a mixture
between public and private schools within communities when p=O. For this reason, while we will
continue to report results for p=O when they offer insights into different institutional funding
mechanisms, we will forego reporting voucher simulations for the uninteresting case of p=O.35
When p=O.5, individual responses become more subtle. From the column “PrPeer” in Table
5(b) it is apparent that the first to make use of vouchers are high income (high peer quality)
studen~. Furthermore, private schools arise first in poor communities as private school attendees
migrate from high income weas. As “good houses” in community 1 are “used up,” private schools
appear in community 2; and as they are used up there m well, private schools finally appear in the
wealthy community. All along, migration of income is from relatively high income areas to
relatively low income areas which causes communities to become less stratified in income,
property values and wealth levels. This decrease in residential stratification, however, does not
benefit public schools in poor communities whose peer quality levels are falling as high peer
quality students leave for either private schools or, more often, other communities with better
public schools. These are the residents that originally occupied the best houses in the poor
communities which they sell to high income immigrants who come for the private school. Thus,
public school peer quality levels fall in poor communities with the introduction of vouchers
because high peer quality resident-s are leaving for other cotnmunities and are not replaced in the
public schools by high peer quality immigrants who choose private schools. At the same time,
however, as the pool of local public school students shrinks while public support for local public
schools remains above 50%, the median voter public spending outcome produces more funding
34 In some earfier simulations we assumed that public schools would always be available at $2500 per pupil, regardless of
whether the voting outcome suggests less spending is desired. In those simulations, the transition from the public to
the private school system in the presence of peer effects is somewhat smoother.
35 Qua~itative results are the same for different reasonable values of p, In particular, we tried values of p ranging from 0.3
to 0,6.24
per pupil as voucher levels increase.sb Thus, per pupil spending on public education in poor
communities rises at the same time as peer quality levels fall. Under the specification of p=O.5 (as
well as most other reasonable specifications we tried), however, the former of these effects
outweighs the latter to produce a higher perceived level of public school quality in the poor
communi~ as vouchers grow. This occurs up to the point when voter support for public schools
falls below 50~0 at which time the local public school collapses and everyone in community 1 uses
the private school vouchers.
The common notion that private school vouchers will cause lower school quality in local public
schools therefore does not necessarily hold in a local public finance economy unless we think that
spending matters sufficiently little as compared to peer effects. In fact, the perceived public school
quality suffers only in community 3, the wealthiest community, which is losing high income
residents to private schools in other communities and thus is losing both peer quality and the
constituency for high per pupil spending. Therefore, all three indicators of quality (spending, peer
effects and parental perceptions) fall, while at lewt two of these rise or stay constant in the other
communities. This implies that, contra~ to commn perceptions, it is public schools in wealthy
communities that suffer unambiguously from voucher systems while those in poor communities
might benefit. Far from increwing inequities in public education, simulations in Table 5 actually
demonstrate that vouchers, while not benefiting low income residents
high enough face value, can help equalize local public school quality.
4.2. Private School Vouchers in State Funded Public School System
directly unless they are of
We now turn to comparing the results from Table 5 to those in Table 6 in which all public
education is assumed to be funded by the state government through a proportional income tax
whose rate is set in accordance with majority nde voting by all voters in the state. Furthermore, the
state government is assumed to spend equal amoun~ per pupil on students in all schools regardless
of community income.37 (This is essentially the California post-Semano, post-Proposition 13
36
37
Since those attending private schools have single peaked preferences for local school spending with pe& at zero, an
increase in the fraction of local residents who send their children to private schools thus causes the median voter, all
else being equal, to shift toward less spending. However, this is more than offset by the fact that the private school
attendees live in the best houses and therefore pay a dispro~rtionately large share of local property taxes without
tting advantage of local public schools. Thus, per pupil spending in public schools increases.
We do not address here the issue of whether average per pupil spending rises or falls as a result of a state takeover of25
system. ) Having seen the intuitive results from the p-+ case in the previous table, we do not repeat
this exercise for the rest of the policy environments.
First, we can note that equality of spending certainly does not guarantee equality of outcomes.
Unless we think that spending is the only input into education that matters, the substantial
stratification of income across communities before the introduction of vouchers yields substantially
unequal outcomes when peer effects matter. While this is a simple point, it is often overlooked by
policy makers and courts who tend to focus solely on variances in per pupil spending levels as a
memu.re of interjurisdictional inequity in the provision of education.
Second, the pattern of school voucher use is substantially the same as in the previous table.
Private schools develop first in the poor community but are catering to high income immigrants
while middle to high income residents of the poor community emigrate to other communities. Peer
levels in the low income public school therefore fall while per pupil spending levels rise so long as
there is above 50% public support for public education within the community, Again, the two
effects are offsetting and parental impressions of public school quality in the community rise
modestly (while this time they fall in the middle community). Furthermore, property values rise in
the poor community. As the most desirable houses become occupied with private school attendees
in the poor community, private schools again begin to develop in the middle income community
and then finally, at extremely high voucher levels, in community 3.
While the patterns of private school use and development under the state funded system are
therefore similar to those under local funding, the speed of the privatization of education as
voucher levels rise is surprisingly slower under state funding than under local funding. One
would, perhaps, expect that high income residents will respond to vouchers sooner under state
funding because they are farther from their ideal level of spending than they would be under local
funding. However, one of the reasons high income residents are so eager to use private schools
under local public funding is that, once they migrate to the poor community, they no longer have to
pay as high a property tax bill. Under state funding, this advantage of migrating and attending
private schools vanishes as high income residen~ must pay income taxes to support the public
system regardless of where they live.
education finance. Sinm our model does not contain the skewedness of income distributions which is important in such
analysis (see Sons telie and Silva (1995)), it would be ill-suited for this purpose.26
Furthermore, we note that, compared to a locally funded system, a state financed system does
not yield ne~ly as many fiscal benefits for public schools in poor distric~. Under a local system,
an exit of some community residents into the private system translates into larger per pupil
spending in the public school in that community. Under a state system, on the other hand, this
same exit leads to an increase in per pupil spending spread across the entire state and not
concentrated in one community. This translates into a much smaller improvement in per pupil
spending (and no darease in the interjurisdictional variance) under the state controlled system than
under local funding and control. At the same time, however, public schools, at least in the eyes of
parents, are still improving despite the outmigration of high income#zigh peer students from the
public school system in poor communities. Finally, in contrast to the previous case, the public
school in the wealthy community no longer suffers but rather benefits because now, it too receives
additional per pupil funding as individuals shift into private schools.
4.3. Private School Vouchers Under bcal Financing Combined with State Foundation Grants
Table 7 presents community averages under different levels of per pupil foundation grants
funded through a state income tax. (Note that all entries in this table assume the absence of any
vouchers program. ) Each community is constrained to spend at least the amount of the foundation
grant on public schools and is free to add additional per pupil spending funded by local, voter-
determined property taxes. These foundation grants are similar to the “redistributive block granm”
analyzed in Nechyba (1996 b). Since the grants have only small income effects and no price (or
substitution) effecw, they Me extremely ineffective at raising per pupil spending in any district
unless the foundation grant is greater than what the community would have spent to begin with.
For example, in Table 7(a) where p=O, public spending essentially remains unchanged in
community 1 until the foundation grant rises to 0.30 per pupil and thus is binding. The major effect
of the grants (which are redistributive in the sense that low income communities receive grants that
are larger than the income taxes paid by its residents to fund the grants) is to make low income
communities slightly more desirable and high income communities slightly less desirable. This is
reflected in the slight convergence of property values, income levels and wealth levels. The
interesting difference in Table 7(b) where p=O.50 lies in the response of private schools to the27
increase in foundation grants.
schools continue to exist. In
So long as these grants are not binding on any community, private
fact, when the foundation grant reaches 0.20, we see a further
migration of high income residents from communities 2 and 3 into community 1 to take advantage
of lower property valu~ and private schools. This is due to the fact that the redistributive nature of
the grants makes these high income communities somewhat less desirable and thus persuades some
of its residents to opt out of the public school system. Once the foundation grant binds in
community 1, however, private schools collapse and their high income/high peer quality clients no
longer choose the low income district. They are replaced by lower and middle income residents
from the other communities who now find it worthwhile to return to community 1 as the public
schools have improved; i.e. they now outbid the potential high income immigrants for the best
houses in community 1.
Table 8 proceeds to simulate the general equilibrium effects of different levels of simple
vouchers in the presence of a foundation grant system of 0.40. While the evolution of private
schools with increases in vouchers is the same as before for exactly the same reasons, the effects
on public schools from the same type of private school vouchers are now substantially different:
By all measures of school quality (pure spending, pure peer effects and parental perceptions),
public schools in all communities deteriorate as higher levels of vouchers are introduced. In the
poor community, for example, the fact that the foundation grants are given in per pupil amounts,
and the fact that the grant is sufficiently large to be binding, implies that local per pupil spending
remains the same as relatively high peer quality students are leaving the local public system for
other school districts without being replaced by the high income immigrants who are choosing
private schools. Thus, the peer quality falls in the community’s public school while per pupil
spending does not rise as it did under local financing and, to a lesser extent, understate financing.
There is, therefore, no opposing effect to the deterioration of public schools brought about by the
decline in peer quality, which means parental assessments of the local public schools fall (which in
turn pushes further high peer quality students into private schools and out of the community).
While vouchers still have the eflect of decreasing the stratification of income, wealth and property
values across communities, they can no longer improve education for both public and private
students under a binding foun~tion grant system.jg28
4,4. Private School Vouchers under A System of heal Financing and District Power Equalization
Finally, we examine the effect of private school vouchers under district power equalization
(DPE). DPE is a state program that sets a guaranteed per pupil tax base Pi for each community i
and guarantees the community a per pupil spending of <Pi. If the actual per pupil tax base is below
the guaranteed base, the state government makes up the difference; if the actual level is above the
guaranteed base, the state government collec~ the balance and uses it to fund the paymenw to low
base communities. As demonstrated in Nechyba (1996b), this system is equivalent to as ystem of
positive and negative matching grants that contains both income and price (substitution) effects.
We will assume here that the state program is revenue neutral; that is, the bases are set in such a
way as to insure that the sum of the negative payments to high income communities is equal to the
sum of positive payments to low income communities. Furthermore, we will say that a program is
“xYobase equalizing” if it sets bases such that the high income community’s base is XYO higher than
the middle income community’s base which in turn is XYO higher than the poor community’s.
When x–+, we will call the program “FuH Revenue Neutral District Power Equalization.”
Table 9 summhzes the general equilibrium effects of different degrees of revenue neutral DPE
assuming both p=O and p=O.5. (These resul~ are in the absence of any voucher programs.) For
the same reasons m in the last section, increasing equalization leads to decreases in stratification in
income, wealth and property values. (Due to the additional price effects of the implicit matching
grants, these effects are somewhat larger.) Also for similar reasons, private schools collapse with
increasing degrees of district power equalization as public schools improve in poor districts
causing middle income residents to return to the better houses in community 1. Unlike the
foundation grants, DPE is, however, effective at reducing public school spending disparities
between school districts even at low levels of the program. This is a direct result of the fact that,
unlike foundation grants, DPE lowers the price of public schools substantially in poor communities
and raises it substantially in high income communities. As can be seen from Table 9(a), it is easily
possible for a full DPE program to even reverse the order of communities in terms of their per
pupil spending levels.sg
38 This is, in spiri~ similar to the Epple and Romano ( 1996) and Manski (1992) result in that the level of public school
spending in the poor community is exogenous to the local political process. Therefore, the positive fiscal benefits
from having high income residenk who do not use local public schools do not wise.29
Next we demonstrate the general equilibrium effects of private school vouchers in the presence
of district power equalization in Table 10. The striking feature in this table is the very different
pattern of private school development compared to all three previous institutional settings. In
particular, while under local financing, state financing, and foundation gran~ it was always the
case that private schools appeared slowly and in poorer communities first, we see here a rapid
switch to private schools in the wealthiest community. While high income residents do migrate into
the poor community and a modest amount of private school activity takes place there as the level of
vouchers increases, the bulk of private school attendance occurs in community 3 for most levels of
the voucher program. Once the most desirable houses in community 1 are filled with high income
private school attendees, the remaining homes are held by residen~ who value the DPE-improved
local public school. Similarly, only a limited number of houses are available to high income private
school attendees in community 2 which still leaves a large number of high income agents in
community 3 who are dissatisfied with the DPE-induced reduction in educational quality in their
public schools. Furthermore, unlike in the case of state funding or foundation gran~, residents of
high income communities can eliminate the adverse price effec~ from DPE by switching to private
schools. (This is because redistribution to low income communities occurs only to the extent that
the high income community has positive tax rates. If everyone in community 3 switches to private
schools, local tax rates can fall to zero and thus stop redistribution.) Thus, a sufficient number of
community 3 residents choose to abandon the public school system to remove public support from
the system and drive property tax rates in community 3 to zero. We thus see the collapse of the
public school system first in the wealthiest community under DPE because that community is
under extreme adverse pressuresfiom the DPE program, pressures that can be eliminated (unlike
foundation grants) by aban~ning the public school system.
While per pupil spending rises in community 1 as a result of the exit from the public system,
this increase is not nearly m big as it would have been had the public schools in community 3
survived. The collapse of those schools severely undermines district power equalization which
relies on revenues from the high income districts to finance price subsidies to low income districts,
39 For a more complete treatment of the relative differences between district power equalization and foundation grants on
both local and state government behavior within the context of this model, see Nechyba (1996b).30
As a result, while per pupil spending does rise and help offset the decline in peer quality in the low
income public schools (from the exit to the private system), it is now no longer sufficient to cause
an improvement in parental perceptions of educational quality in that community. Thus, unlike the
case of pure local funding as well as state finding, parental perceptions of public school quality
falls in all three communities. This decrease is not, however, as large as the decrease observed
underfoundation grants. The latter is true because, while per pupil spending remains constant as
high peer quality students leave for other schools under binding foundation grants, per pupil
spending can (and does) nevertheless rise under DPE. Thus, even if the effect is not large enough,
there is a positive effect on local public spending (that does not have a parallel under foundation
grants) as vouchers are introduced under.
5. Summary, Limitations, Empirical Questions and Conclusion
This paper has extended the literature on computational models of private school choice by
endogenizing local public outcomes and local populations, and by considering how competition
affects local public schools under a variety of institutional settings. While we have reported
simulation results mainly for the case in which parents perceive peer effects to be as important as
per pupil spending, the results also hold for other reasonable levels of perceived peer quality
effects. We can thus come to some broad genertizations and point to open empirical questions:
1. In the absence of private schools, the presence of peer effects causes substantial increases in
interjutisdictio nal stratification and inequities in the provision of public schools. While even
under zero peer effec~ we expect disparities to arise due to different demands for public
spending by different income groups in different communities, the presence of peer effects that
are correlated with socioeconomic status provides additional incentives for high income types
to separate into their own communities. As perceived peer effects become unrealistically high,
individuals abandon the public schools to attend more tailor-made private schools. Although
we have argued strongly that the available evidence points to the presence of such perceived
peer effec~, to what extent peer effects play a large role in improving actual school quality
remains an unsettled empirical question. The normative interpretation of our positive results
clearly depends critically on a more objective definition and understanding of school quality.31
2. Throughout the analysis, whenever private schools arise either because of high peer quality
effects or because of private school vouchers, stratification of income, wealth and property
values across communities becomes weaker. More precisely, high income/high peer quality
types migrate to low income communities with the intention of paying lower house prices and
taxes and sending their children to private school. Thus, private schools appear first in poor
communities, but they cater not to the original residents but rather to high income immigrants.
3. Although the emergence of private schools thus causes greater interjurisdictional mixing
between income types, public schools in poor communities lose high peer quality students.
This occurs because those leaving to make room for the high income, private-school-
consuming immigranw are the former residents of the best houses in the poor community who
are also the highest income residen~. These parents and students leave the local public system
in the poor community not with the intention of attending private schools but rather to attend
public schools elsewhere. They leave because the higher income immigrants who wish to
attend private schools are willing to pay more for the houses the emigrants originally occupied.
4. The previous two poinu can be summarized as follows: The presence of private schools (and
the introduction of vouchers) increases school-based stratification while it decreases
residence-based stratification. This decrease in residence-based stratification (which is
consistent with some evidence cited in the text) creates fiscal benefits for public school students
in poor ~eas when public schools are funded, at least in part, locally. More precisely, those
moving into the community do not use local public schools but still pay a disproportionately
large share of local taxes. Therefore, even though they may vote for less spending, per pupil
spending rises (unless more than 50% of voters send their children to private schools, )
5. To the extent that peer quality matters not only in schools but also in communities in general (m
suggested by Durlauf (1996), Wilson (1987), Jencks and Mayer (1990), Crane (1991) and
others), the decrease in residential stratification is a positive effect of vouchers that has not
previously been emphasized. We do not, however, explore these neighborhood effec~ in the
current paper. If neighborhood externalities are primarily positive and run from higher income
agents to lower income agents, the descriptive results of the analysis do not change32
substantially. (High income individuals still move to good houses in low and middle income
neighborhoods when sending their children to private schools.) At the same time, the
interpretation of the results would change because the decrease in residential stratification
would then not only be potentially equity-enhancing (because of fiscal benefits to those
attending public schools in low income communities) but also efficiency enhancing in that
greater residential mixing of agenu is Pareto improving. However, if negative neighborhood
externalities also run from low income agents to high income agents, the migration effects
might be muted, and no clear efficiency interpretation could be given. Unfortunately, while
there is widespread speculation that non-school related neighborhood effects are important,
there is little agreement exactly what form these externalities take. Furthermore, there is little
empirical evidence regarding the extent to which perceived neighborhood peer effects (which
motivate migration choices) differ from actual neighborhood effects.
6. The extent to which the loss in public school peer quality in low income communities (resulting
from an increase in vouchers) affects public school quality depends on the degree to which
parental perceptions of the relative importance of peer quality are correct as well as the
institutional setting used to finance public education. Under both local funding and state
funding, per pupil spending rises in the poor community and more than offsets the loss in peer
quality if parental perceptions are accurate (or if they overestimate the importance of peer
effects). Under foundation grants and district power equalization, on the other hand, local
public schools worsen in the poor community because per pupil spending either remains
constant or does not rise sufficiently much to offset the losses in peer quality (unless parents
are overestim sting the importance of peer effects. ) Our simulations suggest that if we are
primarily concerned about parental perceptions about public school quality in poor communities
(or, for that matter, about per pupil spending in poor public schools), vouchers are most
desirable under a locally funded school system and become progressively less desirable under
state funding, district power equalization and foundation aid. Again, better empirical evidence
on which of our “quality” measures (parenti perceptions, spending, or peer quality) accurately
reflect actual school quality is needed for a full normative analysis of our positive results.33
7. Finally, the results also have implications regarding the targeting of vouchers. It is often ~gued
that the equity implications of private voucher proposals become significantly more favorable
when the vouchers are targeted at low income residents or at low income communities.
However, the distinction between these two ways of targeting is quite important. If the
vouchers Me targeted at low income parents, our simulation resdh indicate that they will have
to be of fairly high face value in order to convince low income parents to opt out of the public
system. If however, they are targeted to low income communities (as recently done in
California), then our resul~ remain intact as long as immigrmts into those communities can
make use of vouchers as well. Again, high income residents will migrate to take advantage of
the vouchers which is something they are already doing in the model even when vouchers are
not targeted. Thus, our analysis suggesw that targeting either makes the program less effective
or is no different than an untargeted program depending on how the targeting is accomplished.
We would like to conclude by emphasizing that, while we think these results are new in the
literature and quite relevant for thinking more deeply about vouchers, several limitations shodd be
kept in mind. First, many of our interpretations may have to be modtiled as new empirical evidence
regarding the issues raised in the points above emerges. Second, we have assumed that all agents
in this model are perfectly informed. Often, a criticism of vouchers has been that low income
parents may not be informed enough to make use of vouchers, and thus previous models
overpredic t the effectiveness of vouchers in getting low income parents to exert competitive
pressures on their public schools. While we think that this is a valid criticism, it is not as relevant
for our restits as it was in the previous literature. In particular, low income agents are not the ones
choosing to use the vouchers, at least not at relatively low voucher levels. Rather, high income
residenfi that migrate into low income communities are using the vouchers and, we think, can be
expected to be more informed. Those residents in poor districw that are leaving the the low income
public schools are not doing so because they are choosing to use vouchers but rather because
market pressures drive them to move to a different community and a different public school.
Third, one of the major political hurdles to implementing vouchers is that currently a large
number of children already attend private schools. A broad voucher program will thus be costly34
even if it does not achieve any change in behavior. In our model, however, few children attend
private schools without a voucher program. We commented before that we think this is due to the
fact that we have assumed identical preferences for all agents while, in the real world, some agents
have preferences for particular forms of private education quite apart from anything having to do
with spending levels or straight peer effects. Our model does not capture those types of private
school consumers. Also we have not explicitly considered agents with very high incomes who
would choose private schools even under the current assumption if identical preferences.
Fourth, in the absence of construction and renovation, migration only occurs to the extent to
which acceptable housing can be found in low income communities .40 We think that most
communities are in fact not perfectly homogeneous in housing quality and that at least some
relatively more attractive housing opportunities exist even in most low income jurisdictions.
Furthermore, although more empirical studies are needed, available anecdotal evidence regarding
subsidized Catholic schools suggests that middle income agents often do, in fact, migrate to low
income communities to take advantage of private schools there. Keeping in mind that all agents in
our model are “middle income” (given a top household income of $80,000), this is consistent with
our results. The inclusion of very high income agents, however, would result in those agents
choosing private schools without migrating from the best houses located in the best communities.
Finally, we should emphasize once again that we have made a series of assumptions that we
thought, a priori, very much “stacked the deck” against vouchers. By assuming away all beneficial
effects from increased competition because all schools, public and private, are efficient even
without vouchers, we have eliminated the main economic argument in favor of vouchers,
Furthermore, we assumed private schools are extreme “cream skimmers” that discriminate against
low income/low peer quality students. Thus, we have not only eliminated the common efficiency
argument for vouchers but also assumed a private sector that seems less than equity oriented. Still,
we demonstrate that the equity argument against vouchers holds only under certain institutional
settings or when school peer effecfi are larger than recognized by parents. Furthermore, since
vouchers are demonstrated to reduce residential stratification, they may bring about positive
neighborhood effects in low income communities that have not been part of the previous analysis.
40 The model could also be extended to include construction and renovation which would strengthen our migration results
as well as give rise to them even if housing was uniformly bad in low inmme communities to begin with,35
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TABLE 1
Summary of Computable General Equilibrium Model Including Parameter Values
General Model CGE Version and Parameters
Community Structure c= Cfic N I(m,h)~ MxH} N=[O,l]; M=[l,2,3} ;H={l,2,3); and p (cih)=~ V(m,h)
Endowment Types E = (Efii I(m,h,i)~MxHxI) 1={1,2,3,4,5}; #(Etii ) = & V (m,h,i); and
U = (U’:MXHXRS2+R+ I n~N)
(z(etil),...,z(eti )) = (2, 3.5,5, 6.5,8) V (m,h)
un(m,h,s,c) = kti SPC7V n~ N where
(D, Y)= (0.06, O-@),a and
(k,,,..., kl~, kzl,..., k,~) =
(0.82, 0.89, 0.96, 0.85, 0.95, 1,05, 0,93, 1.03, 1.13)
Perceived Production
of School Quality ~: R:+R+
(1-P)p P s =f, (2,, 1,)= z, s
a The actual specification of the utility function in the CGE programs contains an additional arguments (a state public good)
with Cobb Douglas coefficient CC=O. 13. While in past papers (Nechyba (1996b,c)) the level of state public good spending has
been determined endogenously, it is exogenous in this model (set consistent with New Jersey data) and financed through an
exogenously set state income tax. Thus, it becomes a constant and irrelevant for tie choices analyzed in the current paper.41
TABLE 2
Benchmark Equilibrium Without Fiscal Interaction and
.. . witi Peer Factor p=O.00
Community Averagesa
Income Wealth Propertyb Prop. Taxc Schoold LPSpende LPeerf %Private
Community 1 3.3000 4,3900 0.6550 0,4247 0.2782 0,2782 0.2200 0,oooo
Community 2 5,2000 6,3027 1.0250 0,3880 0.3977 0,3977 0.3467 0.0000
Community 3 6.5000 7,5573 1.5700 0,2706 0.4248 0.4248 0.4333 0.0000
House Vahres
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Average Private Peer Level
Community 1 0.4350 0.6301 0.9000 0.0000
Community 2 0,5800 0.9799 1.5150 Average Private Output







All dollar values are scaled by $10000.
Roperty values are expressed as annual payments on a fixed rate mortgage at 7% interest.
Property tax rates may appear high because they are tax rates on annual payments, not on the full value
of the property.
“School” represents parentally perceived school quality (which is the same as school spending in this
simulation because of the absence of peer effects).
“LPSpend” is per pupil spending on education in the local public school.
“LPeer” is tie peer quality level in the local public school.42
TABLE 3
Equilibrium Without Fiscal Interaction and p=O.50
(a) Public School Benchmark Equilibrium
(i.e. No Private Schools)
Community Averages*
Income Wealth Property Prop. Tax School LPSpend LPeer %private
Community 1 3.0000 3,8773 0.4983 0.5671 0.2377 0.2826 0.2000 0.0000
Community 2 5.0000 6.1405 1.0325 0.4017 0.3718 0.4147 0.3333 0.0000
Community 3 7,0000 8,2925 1.7800 0.2863 0.4877 0,5097 0.4667 0.0000
House Values
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Average Private Peer Level
Community 1 0.2750 0.4750 0.7450 0,0000
Community 2 0.5475 1.0050 1,5450 Average Private Output
Community 3 1.1700 1.7700 2.4000 0,0000
(b) Actual Equilibrium (with Private Schools)
Community Averages*
Income Wealth Property Prop. Tax School LPSpend LPeer %private
Community 1 3,4000 4,3009 0.5325 0.5325 0.2523 0.3109 0.2048 0.0667
Community 2 4.6000 5.7523 1.0075 0.3976 0.3505 0.4006 0.3067 0.000o
Community 3 7.0000 8,2684 1.7683 0,2861 0.4859 0.5060 0.4667 0.000o
House Values
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Average private Peer Level
Community 1 0.3200 0.5350 0.7900 0.4439
Community 2 0.5425 0.9800 1.5000 Average Private Output
Community 3 1.1600 1.7650 2.3800 0.5333
*Note: All dollar values are scaled by $10000. Roperty values are expressed as annual payments on a fixed
rate mortgage at 7~0 interest. Roperty tax rates may appear high because they are tax rates on these
annual payments, not on the full value of the property.43
TABLE 4
Benchmark Equilibria with Local Financing and Different Levels of Peer Effects (p)*






































































































































































*As peer effects rise, the utility functions me re-parameterized to keep spending roughly constant; i.e. ~*p =0.06 in
all simulations.44
TABLE 5
Equilibria with Different Levels of Vouchers and Local Financing
Voucher Income Wealth Property Prop. Tm School LPSpend LPmr PrPeer ~.private
(a) Peer Effect: p=O.O
Community 1
0.00-0.25 3,3000 4.3900 0.6550 0.4247 0.2782 0.2782 0.2200 ****
0.30 3.7000
0.0000
4.6755 0.7800 0.0000 **** 0.0000 **** 0,2467 1.0000
0.35 3.6000 4.6793 0.8033 0 0.0000 **** 0.0000 **** 0.2400
0.40 3.7000
I.0000
4.5607 0.6042 0.0000 **** 0.0000 “*** 0.2467 1.0000
Community 2
0.00-0.25 5.2000 6.3027 1.0250 0.3880 0,3977 0.3977 0.3467 **** 0,0000
0.30 5.2000 6.0358 0,8367 0.4827 0.4039 0.4039 0,3467 **** 0.0000
0.35 4.9000 5.9603 0,8183 0.4969 0.4066 0.4066 0,3267 **** 0.0000
0.40 4.9000 6.0335 0,9617 0.0000 **** 0,0000 **** 0.3267 1.0000
Community 3
0.00-0.25 6,5000 7,5573 1.5700 0,2706 0.4248 0.4248 0.4333 **** 0.0000
0,30 6,1000 7.2670 1.3617 0.3031 0.4127 0,4127 0.4067 ****
0.35 6.5000
0.0000
7.3303 1.3483 0,3041 0.4100 0,4100 0.4333 ****
0.40 6.4000
0.0000
7.4617 1.4900 0.0000 **** 0.0000 **** 0,4267 1.0000


































































































































































































Equilibria with Different Levels of Vouchers and Full State Funding
Peer Effect: p=O.5
























































































































































































































































Equilibria with Different Levels of Foundation Grants














































































































































































































































































































































Equilibria with Different Levels of Vouchers and Foundation Grant= 0.40
Peer Effect: p=O.5







































































































































































Equilibria with Different Levels of Revenue Neutral DPE


















































































































































































Equilibria with Different Levels of Vouchers and Full Revenue Neutral DPE
Peer Effect: p=O.5
Voucher Income Wealth Property Prop. Tax School LPSpend LP&r PrPeer %Private
Community 1
0.00-0.15 3.3000
0.20 3.3616
0.30 3.7000
0.35 3,6634
0.45 3.6691
0.50 3.7000
Community 2
0.00-0.15 5.1039
0.20 5.2384
0.30 4.8000
0.35 4.8366
0.45 4.8309
0.50 4,9000
Community 3
0.00-0.15 6,5961
0.20 6.4000
0.30 6.5000
0.35 6.5000
045 6.5000
0.50 6.4000
4,3312
4,3860
4.5153
4.5041
4.5333
4.4384
6.3125
6.3640
5.8711
5.8892
5,8785
5,9215
7.6229
7.5676
7.7276
7.7500
7.7673
7.5000
0,6717
0.6933
0.5217
0.5250
0.5283
0.4953
1.0450
1,0692
0.8117
0,8312
0,8567
0.8867
1.5500
1.5583
1.7483
1.7583
1,7700
1,4350
0.5146
0,4852
0,6104
0.5243
0.6147
0.0000
0.4695
0.4539
0.5188
0.4760
0.4405
0.0000
0.3628
0.3583
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.3429
0.3342
0.3219
0,3262
0.3261
****
0.4073
0.4106
0.3369
0,3384
0.3281
****
0.4070
0.4033
****
****
****
****
0,5344
0,5530
0.5979
0.6137
0.6135
0.0000
0.4876
0.4828
0,5083
0.5849
0,5496
0,0000
0.3768
0.3811
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.2200
0.2020
0.1733
0.1733
0.1733
****
0,3403
0,3492
0.2233
0.1958
0.1958
****
0.4397
0,4267
****
****
****
****
0.0000
0.5333
0.3934
0.3861
0,3872
0.2467
0.0000
0.0000
0.5134
0.4672
0.4666
0.3267
****
****
0.4333
0.4333
0.4333
0.4267
0.0000
0.0667
0.3333
0.3333
0,3333
1.0000
0.0000
0,0000
0.3333
0.4667
0.4667
1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
I .0000
1,0000
1.0000
1.0000